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In: Economic Issues, Problems and Perspectives Ser.
Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1 -- Unemployment Insurance: Actions Needed to Ensure Consistent Reporting of Overpayments and Claimants' Compliance with Work Search Requirements* -- Abbreviations -- Why GAO Did This Study -- What GAO Recommends -- What GAO Found -- Background -- UI Program Administration and Funding -- Work Search Requirements for UI Claimants -- Process for Identifying Work Search Overpayments in State Benefit Accuracy Measurement Audits -- Reported Causes of UI Improper Payments -- Trend in Reported Work Search Overpayments -- Conducting More Work Search Investigations Is Associated with Lower Estimated Work Search Overpayment Rates, as Is the Use of Formal Warnings -- Investigating Claimant-Reported Job Contacts Is Associated with Lower Work Search Overpayment Estimates, but the Extent to Which States Verified Contacts Varied -- Frequent Use of Formal Warnings Is Associated with Reporting Lower Work Search Overpayments, but DOL Recently Determined Their Use Is Legally Impermissible -- Higher Percentages of Claimants Required to Search for Work Are Associated with Higher Work Search Overpayment Rate Estimates -- Selected States Used Multiple Approaches to Address Work Search Overpayments, but Cited Challenges Verifying Claimants' Work Search Activities -- DOL Monitors States' Work Search Overpayment Rate Estimates and Provides Assistance, but Lacks Clear Procedures on Work Search Verification -- DOL Monitors States' Work Search Overpayment Rate Estimates and Has Identified Strategies and Provided Tools to Help States Reduce Their Rates -- DOL Directs States to Investigate a Sample of Claimants' Work Searches, but Has Not Clarified Procedures on Verifying Work Search -- Conclusion -- Recommendations for Executive Action -- Agency Comments.
Unemployment insurance (UI) provides temporary income support to workers who have lost their jobs and are seeking reemployment. This paper reviews the origins of the federal-state UI system in the United States and outlines its principles and goals. It also describes the conditions for benefit eligibility, the benefits themselves, and their financing through the UI payroll tax. The UI system is complex and includes many interested parties, including employers, worker advocates, state UI administrators, and the federal government. These parties' differing views have led to controversies over benefit eligibility, adequacy, and whether the states or federal government should bear primary responsibility for UI. The Great Recession caused most states' UI trust funds to become insolvent and has led to renewed debate over the structure and financing of the system.
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In: Economic affairs: journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Band 14, Heft 5, S. 27-30
ISSN: 1468-0270
The introduction of social insurance in Britain stemmed ultimately from Beveridge's and others' desire to abolish poverty. Beveridge failed to understand that social insurance is incompatible with private insurance markets, and especially unemployment insurance.
SSRN
Working paper
In: American federationist: official monthly magazine of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Band 41, S. 1295-1298
ISSN: 0002-8428
In: Public administration: an international quarterly, Band 5, S. 200-275
ISSN: 0033-3298
In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 6-22
ISSN: 1468-0440
In: Current History, Band 45, Heft 5, S. 65-70
ISSN: 1944-785X
Has supplements. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Vols. for 1955- compiled by the Office of Legislative Counsel. ; Supersedes: California. Laws, statutes, etc. California unemployment insurance act.
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In: Public administration: an international journal, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 260-275
ISSN: 1467-9299
A European unemployment insurance scheme has gained increased attention as a new and ambitious common fiscal instrument which could be used for temporary cross-country transfers. Part of the national stabilizers composing unemployment insurance schemes would be transferred to the central level. Unemployed are then insured by both layers. When a country is hit by an asymmetric shock, it would receive positive net transfers from the central fund in the form of reduced taxes and increased benefits, providing risk-sharing for the whole union. We build a two-country DSGE model with supply, demand and labor market shocks in order to capture the recent national insurance system and the unemployment insurance union (UIU) design. The model is calibrated to the euro area core and periphery data and matches the empirically observed cyclicality of the net replacement rate, the wage and unemployment dynamics. This baseline scenario is then compared to an optimal unemployment insurance union with passive and active benefit policies. For all underlying shocks, we find that the UIU reduces the fluctuation of consumption and unemployment while it increases the fluctuations of the trade balance. In case of a positive domestic government spending shock the UIU reduces the negative crowding out effect on private consumption and investment. The model will be used to analyze the effects of national and supranational benefit policies on labour market patterns and welfare.
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In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interaction between the political decision about the level of the unemployment insurance and the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism which may generate multiple stady-state equillibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with high unemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist with an American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnover and low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model features two distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and duration rates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.
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